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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Research questions 
Based on the theme, three research questions have been derived. Subsequently each 
research question has been detailed into a number of auxiliary questions. This 
section will address the theme in a bottom up approach, answering the auxiliary 
questions in order to respond to the research questions and finishing with the theme. 
Where appropriate a reflection on the suitability of the applied research approach 
will be included when discussing the research question. In general the two 
recommendations of (Basili et al., 2002) recommending a tight relationship between 
researcher and developer have been followed and are found to be beneficial. The 
Goal/Question/Metric method (Basili, Weiss 1984) to obtain quantifiable 
observations and checking their interpretation worked well for this research. The “in 
vivo” approach to perform experiments in a naturalistic setting worked well for most 
research. The extensive use of case studies proved beneficial to obtain relevant 
results, as defined by (Benbasset, Zmud 1999). The results are interesting due to the 
case studies being selected based on actual topics found at the stakeholders with 
whom close cooperation existed during the research. The results are applicable as 
the results have been applied to the case studies selected in concert with the 
stakeholders. The results are current as the results are based on technology in use or 
considered for use by the stakeholders at the time of the research. The detailed 
findings documented in chapters 2 to 7 of this work provide guidance on how to 
apply the methods for use in safety critical applications, thereby extending current 
theory. 
How to increase the confidence in software specifications prior to embarking on an 
elaborate DO-178B compliant safety critical software realisation process:
x Can a real-time simulation of the software specifications be combined 
cost-effectively with existing simulations of systems connected to the specified 
system; 
In the aeronautical domain, designing a system involves creating one or several 
prototypes usually including a simulation facility to validate the system 
requirements and the usefulness of the new system. Due to the role of the 
humans involved, real-time simulators are common. The work in chapter two 
shows that combining such a simulation facility with similar pre-existing 
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simulation facilities of co–operating systems into a synthetic environment 
allows to assess the behaviour of the software specifications in its intended 
technical environment i.e. the encompassing system of systems. For the mission 
planning case the integration increases the fidelity of the simulation and thereby 
the confidence in its results. In the networked research and development case, 
the simulation federation allows swifter assessing tools in a realistic 
environment including eliciting controller response, which, if positive, increases 
the confidence in the specifications. When re-using distributed COTS simulation 
technology like HLA, the costs of assessing system behaviour through such 
networked simulation are affordable for the safety conscious domain concerned. 
x Given the essential role allocated to the human in the aeronautical domain, what 
is human-centred design; 
Traditionally the aerospace domain uses a technology-centred approach for its 
system evolution. Such technology-centred approach provides what is 
technically feasible relying on the flexibility of the humans involved to take 
advantage of the new capabilities. In chapter three is it observed that in practise 
this approach does not necessarily deliver the expected performance increase 
due to unforeseen system level behaviour, despite the system complying with its 
specification. Such behaviour is sufficiently rare to remain undetected during 
validation of the specification but frequent enough to justifiable erode the 
confidence of the users. Consequently the users have to reserve mental spare 
capacity to cope with the unintended behaviour resulting in disappointing 
system performance. 
An alternative is human-centred design, described by the following excerpt from 
chapter three. “It’s a process of product development that starts with users and 
their needs rather than with technology. The goal is a technology that serves the 
user, where the technology fits the task and the complexity is that of the task, 
not of the tool (Norman 1998)’’. The often used ISO standard 13407 (ISO-
13407, 1999) describes human-centred design as a multidisciplinary activity, 
which incorporates human factors and ergonomics knowledge and techniques to 
enhance effectiveness and productivity, while improving human working 
conditions. Additional guidance is offered by ISO TR 18529 (ISO-18529, 2000), 
which contains a more detailed list of activities and 44 base practices. 
x Can human-centred design be applied to airborne safety critical software 
development; 
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Case studies are felt to be a good way to assess the applicability of 
human-centred design for safety critical software development. Chapter three 
contains two case studies where human-centred design has been applied to 
create specifications and obtain confidence in their functioning. In both case 
studies the human-centred design performed well, outperforming the traditional 
technology-centred approach. Human-centred design was found to be 
compatible with the evolutionary software development paradigm, which allows 
early and more continuous involvement of human experts. Both increase the 
confidence in the software specification. The observed benefits in the case 
studies confirm the applicability of human-centred design for deriving 
specifications for the safety critical software domain. The case studies indicate 
that human-centred design has to be enforced rigorously to obtain full benefits 
and prevent the caveats of the technology-centred approach. 
The research approach to base the second case study on the experience obtained 
by the first case study can be considered as an application of grounded theory, 
with the results of the first case study being validated by the second case study. 
With these results the first research question can be addressed. A tool set can be 
created to increase the confidence in a safety critical software specification prior to 
embarking on an elaborate DO-178B compliant development process. Two 
described techniques (i.e. federating real-time simulators and human-centred design) 
have been implemented to verify their applicability and affordability on three 
respectively two different case studies with each case study having realistic size and 
practical relevance. The observed benefits in the case studies presented confirm their 
usability for this purpose, thereby answering the first research question. 
Can an organisation without prior exposure to the specific details of the software 
considerations in the airborne systems and equipment certification document 
DO-178B, create a compliant software development process in a real world setting: 
x What is addressed by the airborne software certification document DO-178B; 
This thesis addresses the production of software which behaves sufficiently safe 
for its intended use. Unexpected or unintended behaviour of airborne software 
can contribute to adverse effects on humans ranging from discomfort to fatal 
injuries. Additionally unexpected or unintended behaviour can contribute to 
adverse effects on expensive equipment like aircraft, ranging from minor 
repairable damage to un-repairable loss of the asset. Software is considered 
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sufficiently safe when it complies with the requirements posed by the safety 
classification. Such safety classification has to be performed for the system 
failures the software can contribute to, for its intended use in its intended system 
environment. A third party, independent from the software users and software 
producers certifies the software as fit for use to demonstrate the confidence in 
the software and the system it belongs to. This confidence is needed by the 
ultimate user of the system (e.g. the aircraft passenger which bears the risk) or 
the public in general which bears the risk when third party risk is concerned (e.g. 
people living in the vicinity of a busy airport). As the aspired failure probability 
is well below what can be conveniently observed, such third party has to base its 
impartial verdict on well documented general safety requirements to assess the 
software, the processes which produce it and the required software process 
artefacts. The result is certified safe software. 
DO-178B provides guidance both for the developer as well as for the certifying 
authority, the air transport name for the impartial third party mentioned above, 
on how to achieve and justify the safety of the software in the system 
considered.
x How can a DO-178B compliant software development process be realised; 
Again a case study has been used to address this auxiliary question in order to 
produce results with practical relevance. The work in chapters four and five 
describes how a standard software development process (Hatley, Pirbhai, 1988) 
can be extended to comply with the DO 178B requirements and produce the 
evidence needed by the certifying authorities. Compliant processes, used in the 
work described in chapter four, include structured analysis with real time 
extensions and structured design captured in pseudo code. Additionally major 
parts of the design standard and the C coding standard can be enforced using 
COTS tools with simple and cost effective proprietary extensions. 
Compliant software development processes can be developed and implemented 
without unexpected influence on the planning. 
The research approach of close cooperation between research and practise 
worked well to select COTS-based methods and tools which were beneficial to 
the project at hand. 
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x How much effort does verification require for software classified at the highest 
criticality level relative to other software development processes; 
Due to the scarcity of public information at the time of research, a case study has 
been performed. Since completion of this work some public information has 
become available, like (Reifer 2004), but this does not specifically provide 
public information for software classified at the highest criticality level of 
DO-178B. In the case study described in chapter five the Goal/Question/Metric 
approach is used to obtain information. As expected, software verification 
comprises a significant amount of effort to obtain the 100% code coverage and 
satisfy the Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC) required by 
DO-178B for software classified at the highest criticality level. Especially for 
subsequent releases of the software, due to the inevitable requirements 
evolution, verification effort is found to be a considerable part of the total 
software development effort. 
The research approach of the Goal/Question/Metric method was appropriate to 
obtain the information to address this question. 
x Can the relative amount of verification effort be reduced by automation; 
The experience presented in chapter five shows that COTS testing tools can 
effectively reduce the relative amount of effort needed for verification of single 
modules. Even so, re-verifying the subsequent versions of the software remains 
effort consuming. This observation holds despite the software coding standard 
being developed explicitly taking testability requirements into account. 
As a software verification tool is used, i.e. a tool which can fail to detect errors, 
DO-178B requires the COTS tool to be verified against the tool operational 
requirements. While auditing the COTS tool, we were the first to do so. 
Subsequently others have performed similar audits, illustrating the innovation of 
our approach at the time. 
x Can requirements evolution be accommodated for software classified at the 
highest criticality level of DO-178B; 
The significant amount of time needed for software realisation, combined with 
the very long in service life of airborne software (an aircraft type can last for 
several decades) make requirements evolution inevitable. To obtain results with 
practical relevance, a case study comprising requirements evolution has to 
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experience changes not known at the start of the endeavour, but occurring 
during the realisation, including changes initiated after the first certification. The 
work in chapters four and five complies with this requirement. 
The case study uses an iterative approach. This approach allows for relatively 
early prototypes eliciting valuable feed back. The case study found that tools 
which automatically perform checks of the design help assessing the 
consequences of proposed modifications in other parts of the software system 
and help keeping the evolving design consistent. The case study’s automatic 
tools to enforce the coding standard help maintaining compliant code which 
remains testable and understandable. 
The well documented development processes and well documented product, 
combined with the retention of some key development team members also 
support coping with the considerable requirements evolution during 
development of the first certified version and beyond to create the second 
certified version. 
The research approach of close cooperation between research and practise 
worked well to select a method and a customised version of a supporting COTS 
tool. This was beneficial to the project at hand. 
x What is the relevance of airborne software certification processes with respect to 
the processes required by other software safety certification domains; 
It is difficult to understand why re-usable software, e.g. some operating system 
capabilities for specified Commercial of the shelf (COTS) hardware, after being 
certified for use in aircraft, would not be safe for use in a system with a similar 
criticality level in a chemical plant or medical equipment and vice versa. 
Similarly a satellite navigation system which is certified for use in aircraft 
should also be safe for use by the railway domain. This observation justifies this 
auxiliary research question. 
The synthesis of the software certification documents in chapter six comprises 
two parts. A group of air transport related standards and a selection of software 
standards from other safety conscious domains. A case study was used to select 
the relevant air transport related standards. Most of the air transport standards 
considered are derived from the airborne DO-178B. Often the lower airborne 
safety criticality levels are refined into more levels by defining commensurate 
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intermediate safety requirements. These standards aim for compatibility with 
DO 178B for common criticality levels. 
Unfortunately little commonality is found between the classification and 
software safety requirements of the air transport domain with respect to the 
compared documents of the process domain (IEC-61508), the nuclear domain 
(IEC-60880-2), the automotive domain (MISRA report 2), the medical domain 
(FDA-1252) and the general domain (ISO15026). Similar principles apply but 
none of these standards are based on a harmonised model of the certification 
processes involved. As a result mutual recognition of safety certification 
evidence, let alone safety certificates, is non-existent. 
The research approach of synthesizing an existing body of knowledge is found 
to be appropriate to address this research question. 
Combining these results answers the second research question. The case study 
presented in chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that an organisation without prior 
exposure to airborne software certification can successfully implement a software 
development process compliant with the requirements even for software classified at 
the highest safety criticality level. As significant requirements evolution has been 
successfully accommodated, the process is applicable in real world setting. 
Can COTS be used to obtain certifiable safe software more responsively and more 
affordably for software classified at the lower airborne safety criticality levels:
x Can COTS software of unknown pedigree be certified for lower airborne safety 
criticality levels; 
The study contained in chapter seven indicates that a COTS-based approach for 
COTS software of unknown pedigree can be compatible with current air 
transport software certification for systems with the objective of being 
certifiable up to medium criticality levels of the airborne certification document 
DO-178B. The case study also found that carefully selected COTS (.i.e. COTS 
for which DO-178B compliant software process artefacts are available) could 
even be certifiable up to the strictest DO-178B criticality level. 
x Is a COTS–based approach more responsive than a custom-made approach; 
Again to obtain results with practical relevance a case study has been performed 
to address this question. The use of COTS is predicated on the expected 
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improved responsiveness and the increased affordability with respect to 
custom-made software. The latter paradigm is traditionally used for producing 
certifiable safe software. 
Technically the selected COTS can provide (most of) the required functionality 
for the case study. Somewhat surprisingly the case study shows that a 
COTS-based approach is not necessarily more responsive then a custom-made 
approach. The management paradigm used turned out to be at least as important. 
Full details can be found in chapter seven. 
x Is a COTS–based approach more affordable then a custom-made approach; 
Again for the case study documented in chapter seven this advantage could not 
be observed, with the management paradigm used being an important success 
factor. As these observations contradict the research assumption and are counter 
intuitive they merit additional research. 
The unanticipated outcome resulted in iterations between the data and the 
conclusions, as prescribed by grounded theory. Although eventually this led to 
understanding of the research results and as such the theory used is appropriate, 
applying the theory earlier in the case study would have been beneficial in 
allowing redirection of the work. 
Together these results answer the third research question. A COTS-based approach 
can be applicable i.e. certifiable for software classified at the lower airborne safety 
criticality levels. However careful attention has to be paid to the COTS being 
selected, including the available knowledge of the detailed COTS behaviour in the 
intended environment, as well as to the realisation processes if advantages in 
responsiveness and affordability are to be realised. 
The answers to the three research questions allow addressing the research theme on 
achieving certifiable safe software. The first part of the work, comprising chapters 
two and three, provide methods to increase the confidence in the software 
specification prior to embarking on the elaborate software realisation process. The 
second part, described in chapters four, five and six, demonstrates a viable way to 
develop complaint software development processes for the highest airborne safety 
criticality level, also for organisations without prior exposure the specific software 
certification documents. The last part, chapter seven, provides some information on 
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a COTS-based alternative to the custom based approach, for the lower airborne 
safety criticality levels. 
8.2 Contribution and discussion 
This section summarises the main contributions of the presented work, divided in 
the same three areas as used for the research questions. Following the description of 
the contribution some implications of the work performed are discussed. 
Increasing confidence in the software specification before starting the safety critical 
software development process: 
x The work in chapter two shows that existing COTS real time-simulation 
technology (like the military initiated HLA) creates a dedicated synthetic 
environment in a cost effective way; 
x Also for safe software, human-centred design is a viable alternative to specify a 
complex system for human experts to reliably improve overall system 
performance as demonstrated in chapter three; 
x To obtain full benefits the human-centred approach has to be applied 
consistently. 
Software processes compliant with classification at the most strict airborne safety 
criticality level: 
x The combined work of chapters four and five shows that extending standard 
real-time structured analysis and structured design development processes can 
be certified to the highest criticality level; 
x A significant part of the carefully constructed design standards and coding 
standards can be verified by automatic tools, which can be realised affordably 
even for a single product; 
x By providing these automatic verification tools to the developers, they can 
pro-actively assure compliance with the standards; 
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x Using COTS-based testing tools allows significant automation of the module 
tests. Such computer supported testing proved to pay off, especially during the 
inevitable requirements evolution and the re-testing caused by it; 
x Requirements evolution for safety critical software can be accommodated by 
using an iterative approach; 
x A number of considerations have been developed to increase the mutual 
recognition of safety evidence or even certificates between various software 
safety certification standards including: 
Ɣ Standards should address COTS produced using non-compatible processes 
or even from unknown processes (also referred to as Software Of Unknown 
Pedigree, SOUP) up to specified levels of criticality; 
Ɣ Standards should focus on requirements, which are justified by evidence on 
their effectiveness, in stead of prescribing preferred solutions, which will 
quickly become obsolete due to fast changing information technologies; 
Ɣ Standards should be limited in their scope to address only safety concerns, 
to allow producers maximum freedom in choosing their realisation 
processes and technologies; 
x The traditional openness, which benefited the safety domain, is a suggested 
innovative benefit for the reclusive security domain. 
The relevance of a COTS-base approach for software classified at the lower airborne 
safety criticality levels: 
x For the lower airborne safety criticality levels a COTS-based approach can be 
certifiable;
x Confirming for the selected case that, based on domain specific requirements, 
general domain COTS is available to technically provide most of the required 
capabilities;
x Selecting a COTS-based approach does not necessarily yield the expected 
benefits of improved responsiveness and better affordability; 
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x More attention needs to be paid to the management aspects when embarking on 
a COTS-based certifiable software development process then for a custom based 
development process. 
Some potential implications of the work performed are discussed below. This 
discussion is structured with respect to the relevant stakeholders and subdivided into 
the research areas where appropriate. The identified stakeholders comprise the 
expert users of the systems (i.e. for aeronautics air traffic controllers and pilots), the 
software developers and the certification authorities. The implications for 
researchers are provided in the next section on future work. 
For the traditional users of safety critical systems, like air traffic controllers and 
pilots, the human-centred approach can provide benefits. Indeed for pilots such 
requirements are being included in the aircraft certification process (FAR 2004). 
However for the benefits to accrue, the human-centred approach must be applied 
very rigorously. This means deriving a specification in close cooperation with a 
representative set of future users. The specification must consider a sufficiently wide 
range of cases, from low workload to (very) high workload. Also the human-centred 
approach has to cover the entire systems scope, including rarely used capabilities 
and non-nominal situations. When integrating the (sub)system into the 
encompassing system-of-systems, which is typical in the aeronautic domain, 
human-centred design has to be applied with the same level of rigour. Ignoring rare 
situations and/or integration issues will result in surprises later on in the 
development or introduction process. Should such surprises occur during the 
operational phase, the resulting (and justified) reduction of user confidence could 
significantly infringe the intended benefits of the development (Boy, Bradshaw, 
2006).
The need for human factor certification of tool suites, as being mandated by 
FAR/CS 25.1302, provides benefits. However these benefits need to be balanced 
against the increased user involvement for the certification process, the potentially 
less responsive development process and more time consuming and more expensive 
realisation process. 
A COTS-based approach to system development, if deemed applicable by 
management of software developers, will imply the need for more flexibility during 
the specification phase. Additionally, due to the frequent updates of the COTS-parts 
involved, the specification will require more frequent updates and consequently 
increased user involvement. The more traditional graphical user interface of some 
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COTS might better conform to the expectation of the expert users, which are being 
subjected to such more “standard” user interface at the office and at home (Barnard, 
Reiss, 2006). 
In case the research results are applied in safety-critical applications outside the 
aeronautic domain, the rigorous application of a human-centred approach may be 
beneficial. A careful study of the potential benefits needs to be performed for each 
application domain the research results are considered for. Recently initial work has 
been performed by (Boy et al., 2007) for the transfer form aeronautics to the 
automotive sector. 
Most potential guidance from this thesis results can impact the software developers. 
The detailed guidance is provided in the answers to research questions two and three 
and in the contribution above. Especially the results of the COTS work may prevent 
others from obtaining similar disappointing results. 
For software developers using (networked) real-time simulation to elicit a better 
response from the users can be an affordable way to increase the confidence in the 
specification, before embarking on the next steps of the development processes. 
Similarly using a spiral or evolutionary development process will allow interaction 
with the expert users guiding the expectations of both participants of the 
development process. An evolutionary development process also allows improved 
accommodation of the requirements evolution induced by the other systems the new 
system has to be integrated with. It pays to invest in automating the software 
development process, including deriving the software process artefacts required by 
the certification authorities. It is felt that by increasing software development 
process automation more benefit can be achieved in this area.  
Obtaining data on software reliability performance for the lower safety criticality 
levels may justify (or repudiate) some of the requirements imposed by the software 
certification documents. Eurocontrol is heading this way with its Recommendation 
for Air Navigation Services software (Eurocontrol 2003). Obtaining and sharing 
such information across various safety critical application domains would increase 
the benefits due to larger exposure of the software and the imposed certification 
requirements. However in order to be able to compare such data, all stakeholders 
must use the same or interoperable definitions. Usually this could be achieved using 
an ontology. More information on the use of ontologies in the aeronautic domain is 
provided in (Reis, et al 2006). 
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For systems interacting with trained or professional users human-centred design can 
be considered an established practise for pilots. Consequently its use could be 
seriously considered in similar situations, both within and outside of aeronautics, 
like controllers, the automotive domain and possibly the medical domain.  
The potential impact of this work on the certification authorities could be significant 
when the recommendation for evidence based safety requirements would be 
considered. Currently a significant amount of certified airborne software is in use. 
This software is used by a significant number of aircraft as there are over 25 000 
civil aircraft in use (Kingsley-Jones, 2005), with for many aircraft types many years 
of use and hence exposure to real world conditions. For lower safety criticality 
levels this may provide some indication on the actual failure rates involved. 
However in order to realise this, a good understanding of the certification processes 
and the required evidence is required. This in turn implies an ontology shared by all 
stakeholders involved. Also the stakeholders need to agree on a way to share 
information without infringing on the confidential software development processes 
and operating procedures of the stakeholders involved. Extending such information 
sharing beyond the aeronautical domain, would imply greater benefits but also 
greater effort to share the information and mutually understand it in a compatible 
way. An example of a recommendation on the use of formal methods based on 
available quantified observations can be found in (McDermid, Kelly, 2006). 
On a smaller scale the certification of air traffic controller works suites could be 
considered. However as stated above, this has to be carefully balanced against the 
significant impact certification has on the development and maintenance processes. 
8.3 Future work 
As stated in the approach (section 1.4), the presented research aims to answer 
questions which are justified by the needs of practitioners. Apart from providing 
answers and realising innovations, new open issues have arisen, the answering of 
which are outside the scope of this work. Suggested issues, with practical relevance, 
which warrant additional study, are listed below. These open issues are organised 
according to the research questions which guided the research and organised this 
thesis.
Increasing confidence in the software specification before starting the safety critical 
software development process. 
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The human-centred approach was successful in a complicated case. Applying it to 
more cases would increase the confidence in its applicability for a range of 
situations. As an example, the car driver interface is becoming more sophisticated 
with additional improvements being considered like a head-up display derived from 
the aeronautical domain. Equipment like car navigation systems are intended at 
reducing driver workload. However experience indicates that adding such navigation 
systems can in some situations increase driver workload. This workload increase is 
considered so significant that the Dutch examination process for driving licenses has 
recently been extended with driving with guidance from a car navigation system. 
This experience suggests future work to determine the applicability of the 
human-centred design paradigm for the automotive domain. 
In the medical domain, equipment for imaging and radiation therapy is subject to a 
large increase in the amount of software used. Interestingly, despite all this 
automation there are indications that human error remains the largest single cause of 
incidents. If the latter indications are substantiated, it follows there is merit in future 
work to study the applicability of the human-centred design paradigm for this 
domain. On intensive care units there is a tendency to network enable patient related 
medical equipment. Intuitively the resulting network would allow more software 
support for the various medical staff involved. The aeronautical experience for such 
complex systems suggests future work to assess the merits of the human-centred 
design approach for this domain. 
Certification of the work suite of trained professionals will provide benefits like 
improved productivity, usability and safety; however such certification comes at 
additional effort, time-to-market and hence costs. More study is needed to assess 
whether and when the benefits of certification of a work suite merit the additional 
costs incurred. 
Software processes compliant with classification at the most strict airborne safety 
criticality level.
Simulation can provide useful insight in the behaviour of a specification. However 
simulation can only cover a limited number of situations. Work would be beneficial 
on a specification method which is intelligible for all actors involved, including 
pilots, air traffic controllers, human machine interface experts, systems experts and 
information technology experts. 
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When realising software, the system designer as well as project management would 
benefit from a complexity metric. Such a metric should reflect the capabilities of the 
code versus the internal structure used. Such metrics were not found in literature, 
suggesting research. To be useful in practise the metric should be derived 
automatically from the code. 
Automating the module testing proved to be beneficial. To be able to (partially) 
automate the extensive integration and verification tests of certifiable safe software 
needs additional research. 
If certifiable safe systems can be produced affordably, significant markets can 
develop as solutions for one system or domain can be deployed in other systems or 
even domains. This would provide confidence in the safety of systems, for cases 
where those systems are currently not allowed, which disallowance in itself may 
pose a safety risk. For this to happen, certification standards need to be able to cope 
with the certification evidence from other systems or even domains, while ensuring 
their primary objective, providing safety. This requires research on inter domain 
recognition of solutions and safety evidence. By obtaining safety data from actual 
system usage under known conditions, it will be possible to certify solutions to 
higher criticality levels based on actual observations. Suppose a system is designed 
to fail less than once in a thousand years and is installed in a hundreds of thousands 
cars a year. Research of reliably recorded actual behaviour of the fleet for a 
practically achievable period of time like the order of a year may provide evidence 
of compliance (or repudiation) of the deployed software with its safety requirements. 
Additional meta-level research of such reliably recorded observations of many 
systems for possible relations between obtained evidence and the requirements of 
certification standards looks like an interesting area as well. 
The relevance of a COTS-based approach for software classified at the lower 
airborne safety criticality levels.
The work on the relevance of COTS for certifiable safe software has lead to the 
following open issues. When engineers decide on the possible use of COTS for their 
requirements, the available description of the COTS item is usually limited. A better 
description of the COTS behaviour would allow improving the decision making 
between a specific COTS product, possible alternative COTS products or realising a 
custom-made solution. 
186   Conclusions 
An alternative to COTS could be the re-use of already certified proprietary COTS. 
This also requires a description of the software, its behaviour and its certification 
evidence, without divulging its full realisation details to potential re-users. Such 
descriptions could benefit from research to improve the quality of the description. 
Aerospace systems are often realised by distributed teams. The evolutionary 
approach is a found to be an appropriate development paradigm. In practise 
management of those teams is based on anecdotal experience of the managers 
involved. Management could benefit from researching the success of distributed 
open source teams, which are based on voluntary contributions. 
